Politics

Global Discord: Values and Power in a Fractured World Order

Global Discord: Values and Power in a Fractured World Order

  • Downloads：5675
  • Type：Epub+TxT+PDF+Mobi
  • Create Date：2023-12-25 15:21:56
  • Update Date：2025-09-13
  • Status：finish
  • Author：Paul Tucker
  • ISBN：B0CQFWP8DX
  • Environment：PC/Android/iPhone/iPad/Kindle

Reviews

Robert ，

dense， but essential thinking to understand international orderI am glad this book was not written in German， because it is extremely heavy on categorizations and deeply mechanistic considerations of international relations。 That said， there is noother book out there charting the relationship between Humean theory and systemic international geoeconomic reform so clearly， and this is required reading for students of international political theory。

Yoni Michanie ，

Tucker’s book ought to be assigned in every international relations seminar; it correctly highlights the shortcomings in different theoretical frameworks within the field but recognizes the need to reconcíliate their strengths。 While the framework offered aims to increase international cooperation amidst a dynamic international system transitioning into deeper levels of multipolarity， I think Tucker still diminishes the non-materialistic aspirations of some illiberal states。

Shane Brownie ，

At last， a framework or roadmap for navigating your way through the complexities of todays multilateral Order。 Will stand as an invaluable tool for policy makers in the coming years of challenge and change。

Alessio ，

An excellent book that will withstand the test of time。 Highly recommended to students of macroeconomics and international relations。

Dominic ，

In the beginning — Global Discord （Paul Tucker）One the most important books on international relations I have read， Tucker follows Unelected Power by lifting legitimacy into the international realm。 Clarity is Tucker’s strength， and given the breadth of what is covered in this book， I would argue also concision。 My strongest recommendations。 I begin first by summarising what， on my reading， I believe to be the main thrust of the book。 I conclude with some thoughts on the whole work。 Full disclos In the beginning — Global Discord （Paul Tucker）One the most important books on international relations I have read， Tucker follows Unelected Power by lifting legitimacy into the international realm。 Clarity is Tucker’s strength， and given the breadth of what is covered in this book， I would argue also concision。 My strongest recommendations。 I begin first by summarising what， on my reading， I believe to be the main thrust of the book。 I conclude with some thoughts on the whole work。 Full disclosure， I received a copy of this book as a gift。The circumstances of politics， per Larmore [1]， are fundamental and endemic reasonable （and sometimes unreasonable） disagreement over the right and good。 Given this， how do we live together in peace and cooperate？ This is the First Political Question （of Bernard Williams， a core intellectual influence on this book）。 Contra Hobbes， Leviathan is not the answer （rather， fear is the part of the problem）。 In this book Tucker lifts this question into the international realm。 Rejecting common strands of IR theory （e。g。 Realism， Constructivism） we arrive at an answer involving political realism， game theory， and legitimacy。Perhaps， put another way， what exactly does a grand strategy — or high policy — look like in the twenty-first century？ Concerns of most international spheres — security， economics， migration policy， whatever — are starting to merge into each other。 “Geoeconomics” lies somewhere between threats and war: sanctions applied against Russia （rightly）， “friendshoring”， the return of wholesale industrial policy （e。g。 on semiconductors）。 Tucker finds the received wisdom of IR theory wanting — Realism is thrown out the window， sovereignty barely escapes — and in any case they hardly as prescriptive as we would like。 I find Tucker convincing when he re-frames the problem in terms of economics and game theory （perhaps for aesthetic reasons — I am an economist myself）。 Any sane high policy will avoid wishful thinking。 The West’s delusional assumption that deepening commercial relationships will induce China to liberalise is perhaps the obvious example。 Instead， we should not assume the best of all possible futures — we should prepare for the worst。 In the jargon， this could be about decision making under Knightinan uncertainty （my inference， but makes sense in a complex world）， but it needn’t be。 The answer is the minimax approach， or regret minimisation。 Transformed into an actual policy prescription， this means we need to emphasise resilience。 For resilience to prevail， our international system needs to be incentives-values compatible。 If it is not incentives-compatible， it will simply fly apart。 If it is incentives-compatible but not values-compatible， it will generate potentially explosive legitimacy stresses。 Legitimacy is the answer to the First Political Question， and it is the fundamental source of resilience， delineating disagreement from conflict。Tucker presents a rich analytical framework， drawing from Hume， Williams， game theory， and the English School of International Relations theory （though not wholesale adoption）。We spend a chapter rejecting the Realist assertion that institutions and meaningful cooperation don’t exist。 States should， in fact， want to enter into meaningful cooperation with each other。 Perhaps for reasons of security alone: the costs of war are catastrophic， creating a feasible bargaining range [2]。 Tucker thinks a bit higher: global public goods， common resources， and externalities are all compelling reasons for states to enter into lasting agreements （at least under modernity）。 Think pandemics， climate change， international peace， financial stability， monetary order。Analytically， this is all about coordination games （e。g。 which side of the road do we drive on？） and cooperation games （e。g。 the Prisoner’s Dilemma）。 The solution to coordination games are self-enforcing and incentive-compatible conventions （a type of norm）: we drive on the left， and nobody should want to deviate should they value their life。 Cooperation games are a little harder。 Without Leviathan they generally involve a degree of reciprocity but also reputation and social norms （see also [3]）。 Social norms are interesting — some can be a sort of meta coordination device — and Tucker generally phrases their evolution as a “Humean genealogy”。 The norm of promising （and of good faith） is an example: it develops because it is useful， and then we come to internalise it and so keeping promises becomes an intrinsic virtue。 The development and social embedding of these norms allows a game to shift from thornier cooperation into coordination。We distinguish these coordination games having equilibria from policy regimes deliberately designed to guide actors towards a specific equilibrium。 Now that we have some credible commitment technology， policy regimes develop and publicise a specific solution （the “focal point”） and marshal decentralised enforcement to make this equilibrium self-enforcing。 Since regimes are often （always） incomplete contracts this motivates international organisations as going concerns in order to put meat on the bones。 This is where we start seeing pooling and delegation as legitimacy challenges。 It is also where I would recommend you to read Tucker’s previous book Unelected Power， which delves into these with more detail。All in all， we now have a sensible account of how meta-coordinating norms evolve and emerge， and how this enables deliberately designed policy regimes to be built on these foundations。 We have an account of the sort of problems （e。g。 weakest-link public good provision） that policy regimes and institutional organisations exist to solve， and how they may conditionally present risks to legitimacy。 In the terms of the English School of IR， those evolved norms that underlie the general peace are international Order， policy regimes constitute System， and to the extent that states share norms， goals， and values they are in a Society。 Each of these has complex interactions with the other （e。g。 System can reinforce or undermine Order）。 Broadly， though， as we move from Order to System to Society， the more complexity we see。This is especially true for the kinds of Society: thin， thick and deep。 These are characterised by the degree of overlap in socially internalised norms， evaluative criteria （what is good， right， cruel， humane， or honourable？）， and justificatory regimes （e。g。 morality）。 Society is thin when there are few evaluative overlaps and scant justificatory overlaps。 Some credible commitment is possible due to a norm of promise-keeping and good faith （Tucker notes this is what economists probably mean when they say “rules-based international order”）。 This is a minimal answer to the first political question: peaceful coexistence in the circumstances of politics。When Society gets thicker， our evaluations overlap more。 Perhaps sincerity and accuracy （part of Williams’ notion of truthfulness， but also Fuerstein's notion of epistemic trust [4]） are shared norms here。 Policy regimes （System） with some moral character become possible here。 Society becomes deep when states share the same justification for these evaluations — more or less the same identity？ Per Tucker， this might be described as a form of civilisation。 Note that all deep Societies are thick but not vice-versa。 Tucker then spends part III of the book talking about the evolution of Western and Chinese norms， and uses the Order-System-Society framework to discuss global discord。 So motivating policy resilience and legitimacy。So what， exactly， is legitimacy？ If it is to deliver resilience it can’t depend on outcomes （China’s Mandate of Heaven）。 It can’t depend on tyranny， coercion， or fear: this is part of the problem （fear）。 It can’t depend on some moral conception of the good and right shared by all， as these are not the circumstances of politics。 Legitimacy is not when a simple modus vivendi reigns。 Legitimacy generates a responsibility to not undermine a policy， institution， or system generally （I again think Larmore [1] is helpful here）。 Legitimate normative authority stems from an acceptable answer to the Basic Legitimation Demand of any coercive authority。 Justifications of authority are owed to legitimation audiences （broadly， groups capable of mounting effective resistance）。 When legitimacy is secured （both perceived and actual）， authority does not need to invest so much in coercive technology: it becomes efficient。 Disagreement separates from outright conflict， and higher social complexity is enabled。 Tucker raises an excellent point that coercion technology itself may become more efficient （e。g。 China’s social credit system）， which is probably worth an essay in itself。 These justifications mean that moral considerations are part of the process， not prior to it。 Once these legitimation principles become internalised values （Hume）， incentive compatibility becomes incentives-values compatibility。All of this gives， I think， more force than sovereignty does in international relations。 Internal legitimacy should not be undermined by cross-border flows of anything。 Legitimation demands apply to pooled or delegated authority。 Now so equipped with an account of Order-System-Society， legitimacy， comes what I think to be the most powerful model in the book。 Starting from an international First Political Question， and the legitimation demands any answer to that question generates， we arrive at a model of “concentric circles of legitimation”。 The number and nature of the legitimation principles we share with a state defines in which layer of the gobstopper it lies: the further in， the more we share。 The nerd in me wants to say this is a specific projection of a bipartite graph。 But it is really a model that generates predictions （and so guides） about what kind of cooperation — policy regimes — are possible without generating negative legitimacy spillovers。 For example， a policy regime predicated on a thick moral similarity will not work if a state in the outermost circle is included。 From this model， Tucker generates a set of principles for pooling， delegation， and some specifically for constitutional democracies。In the last part of the book， Tucker applies the framework and principles developed to certain international institutions: the IMF， WTO， regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties， and Basel。 Tucker， throughout the book， also discusses four scenarios which might characterise international relations and global order over the next half century。 As this review is long enough and I have focused more on the framework and model more than the applications， titles suffice: lingering status quo， superpower struggle， new Cold War， and reshaped world order。 My sense is that the new Cold War scenario is more likely。 All of this is illuminating and well worth reading but I now pivot to some general thoughts。First， I think legitimation principles can be and already are part of the the competition between states in their respective outer legitimation circles。 One might characterise this as a campaign to move legitimation principles （something Tucker does speak on） but I tend to think of it more as a weapon: geo-epistemology？ I am particularly attuned to this as it is， essentially， my academic research: links between democratic and institutional legitimacy and social epistemology， and how to effectively measure them。 Legitimation， depending on justification and explanation， and thus testimony， is usefully thought of as requiring epistemic trust: sincerity and reliability [4] （something Tucker and Williams discuss as Truthfulness）。 Think Russia’s disinformation campaigns which ultimately target either the trust underlying legitimation or the legitimation principles themselves。 Does this motivate a domestic epistemic institution， or epistemic cooperation at a thick or deep Society level？ Probably。 Tucker’s framework is useful to me here。Second， Tucker’s previous book Unelected Power is almost required reading here。 Likewise is at least a passing familiarity with political realism， game theory， economic policy， and the liberal international order。 This helps put more meat on the bones that， if included in this book， would probably triple the length。 This is no knock on the book， but help anyone relatively new to the space to build a reading list。 For me， it is an unalloyed positive: taken together there is a completeness， precision， and utility that many other books on international relations lack。Third， I think a section or two on non-state actors might be warranted。 While it is not beyond imagination， given Tucker’s clear communication of his framework， I felt it was something missing in part IV （applications）。 I would be interested in hearing Tucker’s thoughts。[1] C。 E。 Larmore， What is Political Philosophy？ Princeton， New Jersey: Princeton University Press， 2020。[2] C。 Blattman， Why we fight: the roots of war and the paths to peace。 New York: Viking， 2022。[3] M。 A。 Nowak， “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation，” Science， vol。 314， no。 5805， pp。 1560–1563， Dec。 2006， doi: 10。1126/science。1133755。[4] M。 Fuerstein， “Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification，” Journal of Political Philosophy， vol。 21， no。 2， pp。 179–199， 2013， doi: 10。1111/j。1467-9760。2012。00415。x。 。。。more